Austin Harrington, Hermeneutic Dialogue and Social Science: A Critique
of Gadamer and Habermas. Routledge, London, 2001. Pp. 192 . $95.00.
OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: FOR A HERMENEUTICAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
I remembered Averroes who, closed within the orb of Islan, could never know the meaning of the terms tragedy and comedy. I related his case; as I went along, I felt what that god mentioned by Burton must have felt when he tried to create a bull and created a buffalo instead. I felt that the work was mocking me. I felt that Averroes, wanting to imagine what a drama is without ever having suspected what a theater is, was no more absurd than I, wanting to imagine Averroes with no other sources than a few fragments from Renan, Lane and Asín Palacios. I felt, on the last page, that my narration was a symbol of the man I was as I wrote it and that, in order to compose that narration, I had to be that man and, in order to be that man, I had to compose that narration, and so on to infinity. (The moment I cease to believe in him, "Averroes" disappears.) (Borges 1964, 155) UNDERSTANDING Since Galileo and Bacon's revolution, the empirical and methodological advances of the natural sciences have exerted considerable material and ideological influence on the history of societies, cultures, and human lives. Reproducible experiences and controlled observations are taken as methodological exigencies for a discipline to be considered scientific and objective and not simply an illusory construction of the human mind unrelated to either natural or social reality. However, one of the most important problems in the social or historical sciences is our very human, social, and historical ability to comprehend, to understand, and to interpret both within the same language and between alien languages, cultures, and epochs. It is common to observe that societies, and especially their histories, cannot be submitted to reproducible experiences and controlled observations because they are shaped by generations of human lives and minds, and they are not easily subjected to the criteria of natural science. The history of each human society is unique. Human actions, intentions, feelings, and gestures are not comprehended in the same way that we can explain, mathematically and mechanistically, the motion of stars and planets, the movement of bodies in general, the physiology of hearts and eyes, and even plant and animal reproduction. There exists a temptation to equate the natural sciences with objectivity and the historical sciences with subjectivity, since the latter deal with human inner lives, minds, and institutions. Austin Harrington's book, Hermeneutic Dialogue and Social Science: A Critique of Gadamer and Habermas, is part of a long historical tradition that has wanted to raise social and historical sciences to the same rational ground as natural sciences in terms of description, consistency, coherence, rigor, and objectivity. Departing from the basic ideas that neither are the natural sciences nor should absolutely objective and neutral, and that the social sciences should not necessarily mimic the natural sciences' method (p. 5), 1 Harrington's book stresses the political and epistemological responsibility, in public spheres, of those who want to create a fairer understanding of societies and history, without demonizing the natural science enterprise or excusing social studies from acute critical questioning.
In general, the book intends to present an account of debates on objectivity in the social sciences from the Enlightenment to Emile 152 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / March 2004 1. Unless otherwise specified, all references are to Harrington's book.
Durkheim, Max Weber, and the Frankfurt School, in quest of a clear, detailed definition of critical terms, including objectivity, positivism, and empathy. The main argument centers on the scopes and limits of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas's shared idea of dialogue in the social sciences. The context is the German philosophical hermeneutic debate from the end of the 19th century until the present. Harrington reconstructs the scenario in which coherent but not linear reasoning evolves by mutual criticism. Like live beings, ideas as well as understanding, comprehension, and interpretation modify themselves in processes crossing epochs and geographies, despite the fact that Harrington's focus is on German hermeneutic philosophy.
At the end of the 19th century, with the realization that human actions and utterances embody "subjective meanings" that have been inwardly attached to them by their authors and producers with culturally specific values and beliefs, feelings, and intentions, came the claim that the generalizing methods of induction from experience used in the natural sciences, based on subsumption of phenomena under uniform laws of cause and effect, cannot be applied to human affairs (p. 5). The failure of the inductive method to explain human affairs does not mean the end of all rational approaches to social or historical issues. Historians and sociologists seek to understand human actions not with naturalistic methods but hermeneuticallywhether employing psychologically, historically, or socially oriented methods.
According to authors such as Gadamer, Habermas, and Harrington, the social scientist's ability to understand societies and history is rooted in common communication, in linguistic conversation. Empathy is a very important concept. But empathy may signify different things. It can be taken as an ability to feel the others' experiences as sited in ourselves. This is a problematic conception. Harrington states that understanding the other's feelings is not the same as directly experiencing those feelings and does not even require experiencing them. If, on the other hand, "empathy is taken to mean the process of grasping the specific cultural, linguistic and historical context of given events, its meaning seems legitimate" (p. 43).
Schleiermacher, one of the fathers of modern philosophical hermeneutics, considers that there exist two basic types of interpretation: they are drawn from an attempt to understand classical, biblical, and juridical texts as well as other peoples and cultures: (1) the grammatical interpretation and (2) technical or psychological interpretation. The grammatical interpretation is concerned with text comprehen-sion in a specific language. It is structured on the signs of speech, which are widespread in a culture. It tries to investigate the textual language, mainly its inventions, under a syntactic standpoint. But according to Gadamer, Schleiermacher's particular contribution is the psychological interpretation. It is ultimately a divinatory process of placing oneself, emphatically within the whole framework of the author, an apprehension of the "inner origin" of the composition of a work, a re-creation of the creative act (Gadamer 1994, 186) . This interpretation is firmly grounded in psychology, and it is related to the writer's singularity and even geniality. Dilthey, in his hermeneutics, privileges a technical interpretation abducted from Schleiermacher's writings. The possibility of textual understanding is the reproduction of an author's or an actor's mental life. It is founded in the possibility of an individual, a subject "going beyond his temporal experience, to revive the other's subjective production, by revivification of his language" (Dilthey, quoted in Lima 1983, 54 ). In such a context, Dilthey affirms, "Reproducing is living. The methodical comprehension is exegesis or interpretation" (Dilthey 1944, 165) .
By studying especially historical contexts, inner lives, books, texts, and artistic and nonartistic artifacts, the interpreter can grasp the subjective meaning of his objects. By considering social facts as things, historical and social methods are not generalizations from experience but the reconstruction of culturally specific values and beliefs, feelings, and intentions, in a word, the reconstruction of historical or cultural meanings. Gadamer and Habermas argue, according to Harrington, that theorists of understanding and interpretation in the human sciences, such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Alfred Schütz, and Max Weber, "remained hampered by residual positivist attitudes to science" (p. 2). Harrington affirms that Gadamer and Habermas consider that "traditional interpretative methodology," which would include Dilthey, Weber, and Schütz, encompasses all types of positions that affirm the meaningful and intentional character of human action and reject the positivist idea of discoverable covering-laws of behavior, capable of explanation on the model of the natural sciences, "although [they] still construe the relation of researches to their subjects in terms of an objectifying attitude" (p. 24). For example, Harrington shows that according to Gadamer and Habermas, Dilthey would be considered, to a certain degree, a positivist, because he claimed an independent "external realm of spirit" for social and historical phenomena (pp. 99, 120-21) . Such a realm could be accessed objectively, although not with the natural sciences method.
DIALOGUE
Dialogue is a fundamental concept in Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, and Habermas drinks from this source. In Truth and Method, Gadamer presents the problem of the history of understanding that reaches through Wílhelm Dilthey the foundation of the historical and social sciences. According to Dilthey, to understand the meaning of a text is to understand the intention of its author, just as to understand the meaning of a society is to understand the actions and intentions of its actors. Both phenomena involve subjective meaning. Harrington's concern is to evaluate the arguments that Gadamer and Habermas give to the thesis that "the act of research in the human sciences should take the form of a dialogue between the interpreters of cultural phenomena and the subjects whose lives, actions and productions they interpret" (p. 23). Harrington is preparing the way for an acute criticism in chapter 6, in which he will argue that from the fact that Dilthey, Weber, and Schütz do not thematize the importance of dialogue, it does not result necessarily, as Gadamer and Habermas suppose, that they are treating the subjects of research purely as objects, without respecting them as a subject with the same moral status as that of the interpreter. Harrington wants to redeem the objectivity in the social sciences, defending, for example, Dilthey's concept of the "external realm of spirits" against the blemish of objectification that Gadamer and Habermas imputed to him.
Gadamer and Habermas, according to Harrington, do not wish the term dialogue to be understood in any literal sense of actual verbal exchange between interpreters and their subjects. But, in Harrington's words, they unfairly depreciate the extent to which Dilthey, Weber, and Schütz were able to surmount the residual positivist attitudes of their late-19th-century days and were in fact able to develop highly reflexive accounts of the existential and phenomenological presuppositions of social-scientific research. Harrington argues that the reason for the unfairness of this judgment lies essentially in Gadamer and Habermas's misleading assumption that all objectifying attitudes in social science are always reductive, unduly methodologically restrictive, or morally reprehensible (adapted from p. 109). Harrington is against these charges, and he argues that Dilthey is indeed much more sophisticated than Gadamer and Habermas admit in their criticism (chap. 3, 4), not to mention Weber and Schütz (chap. 5).
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In the introduction to his book, Harrington affirms that chapter 6, "Problems with the Dialogue: Challenging Gadamer and Habermas," is the central core of the study: "It challenges the imaginary, hypothetical aspect of their idea of dialogue, their derivation of normative 'agreement' (Verständigung) from descriptive 'understanding' (Verstehen), their endorsement of value-judgement in research, and their general view of the relation of the human sciences to philosophy" (p. 4).
In this context, in chapter 6 Harrington discusses the question of "objective facticity," an ontological aspect of the problem of objectivity. Many philosophers, historians, and social scientists have argued that the reality of society consists of the "objective facticity" social structures exert over the agency of individuals. In citing Berger and Luckmann, Harrington stresses that institutions, as historical and objective facticities, confront the individuals as undeniable facts: "The institutions are there, external to him, persistent in their reality, whether he likes it or not" (Berger and Luckmann, quoted on p. 119). The presentation of objective facticity recalls, according to Harrington, Durkheim's concept of social facts and the thing-like character of social collectives (p. 99). It also recalls Dilthey's idea of an "external realm of spirit" (pp. 99, 120-21), as well as the various doctrines of "third realm" or "third world" of mental products, such as in Popper.
Habermas criticizes such doctrines and directs his criticism essentially against Karl Popper's concept of the third world, accusing Popper's account of being "one-sidedly cognitivist" inasmuch as it is based on the model of scientific problem solving at the expense of wider cultural competencies (p. 120). Habermas disagrees with the idea that culture and society can appear to us like an object with "objective facticity." According to Habermas, between the "second world" of "subjective mind" and the "third world" of objective mind "stand values and norms, which can neither be assessed as true or false, because the proper validity-claims of values and norms is not truth but moral-practical rightness, and their proper function is not representation but social integration" (p. 121).
Harrington notes that Popper includes political discourse in the third world, which at least indicates that he sees it as comprising practical, as well as theoretical, communication. Nonetheless, Habermas has always been skeptical of Popper's concept and sees it as containing residues of objectifying technocracy, despite Popper's claims on behalf of liberal democracy and the open society. These objections are to be found in Habermas's early contributions to the debate, which later became known as "The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology" (p. 156), provoking Popper's incensed reaction.
I would like to stress that Harrington is not a positivist who thinks that science is achieved by induction from experience and observation. Popper would say that Dilthey, Heidegger, and Habermas are all positivists, since their entire project of making human sciences distinct from natural sciences is based on the mistaken, inductivistpositivist view of science. But Harrington knows the importance of theory and traditions to explain and comprehend the social sciences and to foresee their progress.
Although progress, as a sociological or anthropological concept, should be considered heretical, Harrington's book is about this: in a world in which comprehension and explanation are not immediately grasped, our understanding about societies and cultures and human minds is progressively evolving. Harrington considers that it is possible to advance in the dialogue between different ways of accessing the world by criticizing precisely the isolation within which these specific spheres of human life are immersed.
Weber, followed by Habermas, divides the human social world into three spheres of cultural value: (1) science and technology, (2) law and morality, and (3) art and expressive self-presentation. Habermas sees the "gradual crystallisation of our use of language into three basic communicative functions" (p. 20) as corresponding to the three emergent cultural value spheres of modern society as identified by Weber: "(a) prepositional representation, based on truth-claims, implied in assertions, (b) social integration, based on rightnessclaims, implied in commands and prescriptions, and (c) subjective expressions, based on sincerity-claims, implied both in personal avowal and general life-style" (p. 21).
Harrington, then, directs his criticisms in a more positive way, defending Dilthey, Weber, Schütz, and even Popper. He finds that such authors did not present the objective structures of cultural lives as if they were fixed, unchangeable objects. Although Harrington denies that such authors crystallize the social facts he considers, of course, they are endeavored in considering social facts as objective as natural facts. Harrington defends the point that however impossible it may be to escape our basic embeddedness in particular historical traditions and cultural value systems, it seems at least necessary to exclude certain personal idiosyncrasies, ulterior agendas, and all forms of partisanship for private and corporate interests from research (p. 123).
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Harrington, then, proposes his four basic criteria for the objectivity of interpretation in the social and historical sciences. According to him, interpreters have a good chance of producing objective interpretations when they (a) strive for as complete and coherent accounts of the phenomenal features of the interpretandum as possible; (b) provide reasons for their accounts capable of being criticized and argued with by other interpreters; (c) renounce personal-biographical identifications with the interpretandum and subjugation of it to partisan agendas and interests; but also (d) recognize the positive-constructive character of the limits on our knowledge posed by our belonging to different cultures and historical traditions and not try to suspend this belonging altogether. (P. 124) Harrington argues that the main strengths of the shared concept of dialogue in Gadamer and Habermas lie "in the area of the ethical and political regulation of scientific activities by a 'public sphere' of socially reflective citizens," rather than characterizing the internal methods and operations of research itself and providing any direct criteria for objectivity; Habermas, according to Harrington, understands that after the disenchantment of the world, caused by internal rationalization and differentiation into spheres-sciences, morality, and arts-"it has become impossible to criticize scientific propositions with ethical arguments, and vice-versa; or ethical positions with aesthetic claims, and vice-versa; or scientific statements with aesthetic claims, and vice-versa" (p. 139). But in Harrington's view, such criticism is not only possible, but it is highly necessary. He stresses that "it is possible to challenge one sphere from the standpoint of another sphere. . . . Each sphere's domain of validity is meaningless without the claims of the other spheres that delimit that domain" (p. 139). For example, "some one-sidedly biological piece of research in human intelligence" can be challenged, and actually has been, when "motivated or influenced by racial prejudice" (p. 139). This interdependence among spheres is actually the meaning of dialogue that Harrington claims to protect as the basis of a respectful understanding. He concludes his book defending the idea that modernization through science generates both causes of risks but also, simultaneously, solutions to risks. He claims that social scientists have a public duty as citizens to remain vigilant as to the political and economic applications of their work, "but they cannot consequently be obligated to relinquish the norm of detachment in empirical observation" (p. 147)
MY OWN PREJUDGMENT
The first thing that came to my mind when I was invited to write a review of Harrington's book was that it would be a volume in favor of essential differences of the truths and methods between the natural and the social sciences. Prejudgments about a book that one has not read yet-in terms of hermeneutical philosophers, such as Gadamer himself, and social scientists, such as Habermas himself-contrary to what the layman thinks, are the conditions of any understanding and interpretation. The projection of meaning and the expectation of significance and value are indispensable requisites to one who seeks to understand a literary piece, a painter's or musician's masterwork, or even other human individuals who share our language or are from different cultures.
My prejudgment about Harrington's book was structured on at least a double source: (1) in my readings of Gadamer himself but also Paul Ricoeur, Wolfgang Iser, Hans Robert Jaus, Luis Costa Lima, among others, who defend the separation of truths and methods between the natural and the social sciences, and (2) in my readings of philosophy of science, mainly Karl Popper, who argues that there are no methodological differences between the two spheres of human knowledge. And a third constitutive border of my prejudgment relates to the fact that I am a biologist, a genetics specialist, and I have a long-standing and profound interest in evolutionary biology theories. Perhaps a fourth element of my prejudgment was rooted in my Ph.D. work, in which I tried to comprehend the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges's poetical narrative in opposition to postmodernist discourses.
Harrington's book proved to me that some of my prejudgments were wrong. Hermeneutic Dialogue and Social Science: A Critique of Gadamer and Habermas claims that objectivity in the social sciences is attainable. It does not mean that the interpreter should objectify his thematic human subject, the actors on the living stage of history, as if the actors were foreign to the own interpreter's mental nature. On the contrary, as historical actors and interpreters are made of the same mental and linguistic substance, it is possible to arrive at an understanding about the actors' actions and intentions in very different contexts. Of course, the interpreter is always motivated by values, interests, and beliefs, but according to Harrington, that does not mean that the interpreter should not try to achieve impartiality (p. 128).
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Homo sapiens is an ambiguous living being, made by flesh and time, and at the same time a natural and a cultural product, produced in part by a culture that creates him and that he contributes to only infinitesimally. It is very common for social and historical scientists not to give much importance to the biological foundations of human behavior. But to criticize a social scientist such as Harrington because he did not make reference to the biological and evolutionary basis of human modern behavior would resemble the story of someone who asks what is the similarity between an airplane and a dog. The answer: neither of them can make pumpkin jam. However, I want to stress that to bring sociology and biology closer could enrich perspectives on some of the dilemmas of societies caught in postindustrial traps unintended by the actors.
Some attempts to bring together evolutionary biology and sociology are underway. Evolutionary psychology is considered to be sociobiology's heiress. It is an improvement on its predecessor because it deals directly with human behavior; it tries to understand the ecological and evolutionary conditions in which, anthropologically, the human being emerges, first as a social creature, like other primates, and soon as an enculturated organism far different from other animals' proto-culture and proto-linguistic communication. There is a growing and diversified bibliography by social scientists on such issues; W. G. Runciman (1998), for example, is an author who subscribes to this approach.
Other authors have criticized some assertions made by evolutionary psychologists, for instance, the idea that culture is a by-product of genes (Blackmore 1999) . Their preoccupation is the study of cultural evolution aiming at quantifying and qualifying the assimilation, retention, expression, and transmission of ideas (Heylighen 2002) . Ideas, fragments of ideas, and complexes of ideas are conventionally called memes, since Richard Dawkins's (1976) book The Selfish Gene. Memes, as genes, are replicators. Cultures and societies are, in such contexts, an environment where innumerable memes are historically widespread while others disappear. Memes, as culturally transmitted replicators, can be studied using the corpus of evolutionary theory. Such memes could be considered objects without the risk of deobjectifying the individuals who give life to them. As cultural atoms, memes could be subjected to a more systematic investigation. Human psychology and the history of ideas could be taken as autonomous disciplines, although only in their interdependencies could they receive a more general meaning. In my view, such memes have the same species of objectivity as Popper's world 3 inhabitants or Dilthey's "external realm of spirit." Maybe memes could be interpreted as a kind of platonic object; however, they do not live in a transcendental realm, although they reproduce themselves as complex behavior patterns (values, norms, rules, etc.) . Memes are not genetically transmitted but carried by books, costumes, habits, laws, and so forth, using the human brain.
The past two and a half thousand years of European culture have a much longer biological, evolutionary history. Some of us have dreamed that the social sciences will remain open to the possibility of a shared human nature, common to all the peoples of the world. It is not, of course, a nature essentially and immutably given. Dialogue presupposes the claim to dignity, to maintain the ideas of reason and democracy. The conjunction of evolutionary biology (mainly evolutionary psychology and memetics) and Harrington's ideas does not make pumpkin jam, but it could be a step toward constructing a social and biological science that affirms our animal, social, and cultural nature. We are part of a cultural and mental world. It is directed by values and intentions that come out of wild nature, as emphasized by Darwin, Nietzsche, and many others. Unfortunately, often, there is a trend in some or many institutions and ideas to present themselves as unchangeable. Harrington's criticism of dialogue, in Gadamer's and Habermas's philosophy, fights against the idea that all debate in sociology is undermined by subjectivity. On the other hand, he stresses that although dialogue should not be considered essential to methodology either in the natural or in the social sciences, it remains of undisputable importance in the political sphere, where rational agents should allow for the possibility of their own errors and consequently the possibility that others are correct.
